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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction of this appeal is based on Utah Code
Ann. § 63-46(b)-16, which jurisdiction is vested in this Court
exclusively pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2(a)-3(2)(a).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Is a transaction whereby Appellant entered into an

agreement with L.A. Young Construction Company ("L.A. Young")
whereby L.A. Young was allowed to mine, process and haul from
Petitioner's leasehold, slag in consideration of payment of $.60
per ton royalty the "sale of tangible personal property" as
defined by Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103(12)(a)(iv) so as to be
subject to a sales tax?
2.

If such a transaction be subject to a sales tax as

constituting a sale of tangible personal property, is it
nonetheless exempt pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(2)
because payment was made by a warrant or check issued by an
agency of the state of Utah payable to Appellant as a co-payee.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review applicable to each issue
presented by this appeal is whether the Appellant has been
substantially prejudiced by the agency having erroneously
interpreted or applied the law.

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46(b)-

16(4)(d).

iii

Pursuant to Section 64-46-16(4)(d), it is appropriate
for the reviewing court to review the agency's interpretation of
law as a question of law with no deference to the agency's view
of law.

The "correction of error" standard is appropriately

applied to such issues.

Bevan v. Industrial Commission, 131 Utah

Adv. Rptr. 99 (Ct. App. 1990).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY AND REGULATORY PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103(12)(a)(iv)
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(2)
Utah Admin. Code R. 865-19-42S (1990)

iv

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In this case, taxpayer and Appellant Rocky Mountain
Energy Company ("Rocky Mountain") appeals from an order of the
Utah Tax Commission dated February 13, 1991.
The Utah Tax Commission found that the sale of the slag
material to L.A. Young was a sale of tangible personal property
and not the sale of an interest in land.

The Utah Tax Commission

stated "there is no evidence presented by the Petitioner which
would substantiate the Petitioner's claim that the parties to the
contract intended the Purchase Agreement to constitute the sale
of an interest in real property rather than the sale of the slag
material as tangible personal property."
Further, the Utah Tax Commission determined that "the
mere fact that Petitioner was named as a co-payee on the warrants
issued by UDOT does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that
the sale of the slag material was a sale to the state of Utah or
that a contractual relationship existed between the Petitioner
and the state of Utah.
As a result of the Utah Tax Commission's order, two
issues are squarely presented for review:
1.

Is a transaction whereby one party conveys to

another the right to enter onto the first parties' property and
mine and remove materials a sale of personal property; and
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2.

Is payment by the state on a state warrant

inclusive evidence that the state is the purchaser of tangible
personal property when there are two co-payees on the check and
where the material is used on a state project.
FACTS
The following facts were established by testimony or
stipulated facts at the hearing,.
1.

Rocky Mountain has leased from Kennecott

Corporation the exclusive right to mine the slag pile owned by
Kennecott at Magna, Utah.
2.

(Record at page 69.)

Rocky Mountain offered to L.A. Young, and other

potential highway project biddeirs, two alternatives:
(a) Rocky Mountciin would mine and load material
at a fixed price; or
(b) The contractor could obtain the right itself
to mine and haul the material against payment of a royalty of 60
percent per ton.

If the latter were chosen, the rock would need

to be mined at a designated part of the slag pile that would be
specifically dedicated to that use.
3.

L.A. Young obtained an easement from Kennecott in

order to have access to the property.
4.

(Record at pages 69-70.)

(Record at pages 103-105.)

All payments made to Petitioner were made on

official state of Utah warrants made payable to L.A. Young and
Rocky Mountain and were specifically payment for royalty at $.60

2

per ton for the slag which was incorporated into state projects.
(Record at pages 34, 70, 100.)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Rocky Mountain respectfully submits that with respect
to the transactions in question, it did not sell "tangible
personal property" as that term is defined in Utah Code Ann.
§ 59-12-103.

That statute makes a clear distinction between the

sale of property that has been "severed" from real property and
the sale of "interests in land," which interests include
traditional possessory and usufructory interests.
Rocky Mountain also respectfully submits that the
payment for such materials by a state warrant when the materials
are clearly placed in a state project meets the requirements of
Rule 42S of the Tax Commission, Utah Admin. Code R. 865-19-42S
(1990), and that therefore the transactions in question are
additionally exempt from sales tax on that basis.
ARGUMENT
A.

ROCKY MOUNTAIN SOLD TO L.A. YOUNG AN "INTEREST
IN REAL ESTATE" AS THAT TERM IS USED IN UTAH
CODE ANN. § 59-12-102(13)(b)(i)

Pursuant to Section 59-12-102(13)(b)(i), tangible
personal property does not include "real estate or any interest
therein or improvements thereon."
By correlative proposition, tangible personal property
does include pursuant to Section 59-12-102(13)(a)(iv) "all other
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physically existing articles or things, including property
severed from real estate."
Thus, the statute sets up a clear distinction between
the sale of an interest in real property and the sale of personal
property that has been "severed" from the land.
The Utah Tax Commission sought to analyze this question
by virtue of whether or not the right to mine and extract the
slag was a mere "license," or some other interest.
begs the question.

This inquiry

The question is whether or not the rights

granted to L.A. Young constituted an interest in land or is the
sale of severed personal property, not what label is given the
interest.

Affixing a label to the interest does not aid in this

analysis.
It is basic first year law that property interests, or
estates in land, consist of a great bundle of interests.

There

are present interests, future interests, fee interests,
possessory interests, usufructory interests and the like.
are all interests and estates in land.

These

The right to use a tract

of property for some time and purpose is just as much an interest
in that property as is a fee simple absolute. Affixing a label
such as license, profit a prendre or incorporeal hereditament
seeks to define the nature and limitations of such an interest.
The label does not determine whether the interest is realty or
personalty.
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The right to enter on and use land owned by another is
a traditional interest in property.

"Such a revocable privilege

is an "interest in land" as that term has been defined in Section
5 of the Restatement of Property and as this term is used and is
treated."

3 R. Powell & P. Ronan, Powell on Real Property § 428

(1987).
Utah courts have been less than clear on this concept.
The analysis has been at times as to the requisites of
conveyancing instruments, Wasatch Mines Co. v. Hoskins, 465 P.2d
1007 (1970) , and sometimes as to the nature and substance of the
transaction without regard to the form of the instruments.
Stucki v. Ellis, 201 P.2d 486 (Utah 1949).

Even in Wasatch

Mines, the court looked to the underlying "arrangement" between
the parties and determined that the defendant was acting as a
"marketing agent" or "distributor" for plaintiff and this did not
appear to have an interest in the underlying property.
at 1010.

465 P.2d

The modern position is that general principles

applicable to the construction of contracts applies as well to
the conveyance of mineral interests.

Heiner v. S.J. Graves &

Son, 790 P.2d 107 Ct. App. 1990.
In this case, there is no question as to the
"arrangement" between the parties. L.A. Young had the right,
power and interest to enter upon a designated section of the
leasehold and mine and haul the slag.
a $.60 per ton royalty.

For these rights, it paid

The nature of the interest in land
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granted by Rocky Mountain to L.A. Young was such that L.A. Young
was required to obtain an additional easement from Kennecott in
order to exercise its right to use the property interests granted
it by Rocky Mountain.

(Record at pages 103 through 107.)

Under

Utah law, such an arrangement is most probably designated a
"profit-a-prendre" as it consists of a "privilege plus a profit."
Desert Livestock v. Sharp, 259 P.2d 607 (Utah 1953).

On this

point, Utah law is consistent with that of other jurisdictions.
Generally, to enter on land and remove a part of the substance is
considered a "profit-a-prendre."

Such an interest is in the

nature of an incorporeal hereditament.

Gerhard v. Stephens, 442

P.2d 692 (Cal. 1968).
The point, however, is not so much the label to be
attached, as to indicate that a right to enter upon the land, use
the land and extract substances from the land is a typical and
long-standing "interest" in real property, whatever label be
attached.
The record of the transcript is quite clear that Rocky
Mountain did not sell to L.A. Young anything that had been
"severed" from the land as required by Section 59-12102(13)(a)(iv).

Rather, in fact, the Utah Tax Commission stated

in its order at page 4, "Indeed, even the purchasing option
offered to L.A. Young by the Petitioner did indicate that neither
party intended this to be anything more than giving L.A. Young a
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license to enter onto the property to remove and extract the slag
material."

(Record at page 23.)

Had Rocky Mountain chose to mine and process the slag
and subsequently sell it, that would constitute a sale of
personalty within Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-102. From this, the
Utah Tax Commission falsely reasoned that because such a
transaction would involve the sale of personalty, a different
transaction whereby different rights were given to L.A. Young and
no "severed" property was sold must be treated the same way.
That reasoning is totally wrong.

Quite clearly, the form and

nature of the transaction dictates whether an interest in real
property is given or personalty is sold.
For instance, if one owns property containing coal
deposits and grants to another the right to explore and mine for
coal in exchange for a royalty, the subsequent receipt of royalty
payments are not considered payment for the sale of personal
property in the state of Utah.
situation.

There is no difference in this

As in many situations involving the tax laws, the

underlying arrangement is critical and dictates how and to what
extent the transaction is taxable as a sales tax or otherwise.
Although the Utah Tax Commission did not articulate
their reasoning in this fashion, they may have determined that a
"conceptual severance" of the property had taken place by virtue
of the agreement between L.A. Young and Rocky Mountain.

That

issue was addressed in an affidavit filed by Professor Gilbert
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Martinez of the University of Utah College of Law.
pages 127 through 131.)

(Record at

In that affidavit, after reviewing

pertinent Utah case law, Professor Martinez concludes that the
transaction in question involved the sale of an interest in real
estate and not the sale of personalty that had been conceptually
severed.

(Record at page 131.)
Applying such reasoning to this case, it is submitted

that a transaction involving the right to enter upon land, use
the land, mine the land and extract materials therefrom in
payment of a royalty, is a transaction involving the sale of an
interest in land.

More importantly, it is clearly not the sale

of something that has been previously "severed" from real
property as required by Section 59-102-13(a)(iv).
B.

THE PAYMENT BY A STATE WARRANT EXEMPTS
THE TRANSACTION IN QUESTION

Rule 42(S) promulgated by the Utah Tax Commission reads
as follows:
"If the sale is paid for by a warrant drawn
upon the State Treasurer or the official
disbursing agent of any political
subdivision, the sale is considered as being
made to the State of Utah or its political
subdivision and is exempt from tax."
The Stipulation of Facts makes it clear that RME
imposed a strict condition on L. A. Young:

RME refused to enter

into an agreement with L.A. Young to sell access to the rock
unless L. A. Young and UDOT agreed RME would be paid by UDOT.
This condition became a part of the agreement between L.A. Young
8

and UDOT.

The agreement between RME and L.A. Young would not

have existed unless this condition was satisfied.
The effect of this condition was to modify the
agreement between UDOT and L.A. Young.

In order to satisfy RME's

condition, UDOT and L.A. Young agreed that RME was to be paid by
a state warrant for the rock delivered by L.A. Young.

In legal

effect, UDOT was purchasing the rock directly from RME.
Young was only mining and delivering the rock.

L.A.

The state

warrants are clearly for the $.60 per ton royalty.

The first

named payee is Rocky Mountain Mineral. Moreover, the material
was placed on a state project.
Thus, by rote application of Rule 42S, the transaction
in question is exempt.
CONCLUSION
Rocky Mountain Energy Company respectfully submits that
based upon the facts and governing legal authority, the ruling of
the Utah Tax Commission should be reversed and Rocky Mountain
Energy Company given the following relief:
1.

The imposition of sales taxes by the Utah Tax

Commission should be reversed; and
2.

The case should be remanded to the Utah Tax Court

with an order that taxes previously paid by Rocky Mountain Energy
Company, including penalty and interest, be refunded.
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DATED this 16th day of October, 1991.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL St MCCARTHY

By
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